English
美國地圖
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Index of current page
9A The Formosa Statehood Movement
9B The Action the FSM Is Taking in the Present Stage Starting from 2018
9B-01 Helping the people of Taiwan fully acknowledge
9B-02 Launching the PPSC Project
9B-03 Presenting petitions to the U.S. Congress
9B-04 Lobbying the U.S. Congress to enact a series of laws
9B-05 Conducting lobbying activities to get the endorsements
9C Organizations & Leaders
9C-01 In order to promote the cause of the FSM
9C-01a The Formosa Territory Commission (FTC)
9C-01b The Task Force on Plebiscite Petition Signatures Collection
9C-02 Leaders of Organizations
9C-02a Dr. Chung-mo Cheng
9C-02b Mr. David C. Chou
9D The Formosa Statehood Movement and Its Founder
9E Cementing the Tie
9F A Great Cause and Mission
9G An Ardent Appeal
9H Why Taiwan?
9I For more information on the Facebook page of the Formosa Statehood Movement.
9A The Formosa Statehood Movement
The Formosa Statehood Movement (FSM), founded in 1994, is an organization calling for political association of Taiwan (Formosa) with the American Union as an unincorporated, organized territory in the first stage, leading to statehood as a full member of the United States.
9B The Action the FSM Is Taking in the Present Stage Starting from 2018
The FSM is launching its long overdue project at the moment---The Project on Plebiscite Petition Signatures Collection for a Formosa Territory in the American Union (The PPSC Project or The Project) . This is the first step for the FSM to push through the self-determination of the Taiwanese (Formosan) people and the plebiscites for joining the American Union.
The FSM is striving in the present stage to establish a Territory of Formosa (Taiwan), an unincorporated, organized territory of the United States.
The FSM is on its way to holding a plebiscite or plebiscites in Taiwan by making the following moves step by step:
9B-01 Helping the people of Taiwan fully acknowledge that they do have the right to self-determination under international law and completely understand that they stand no chance of holding plebiscites without the acknowledgement, recognition and endorsement of the U.S. government of the right; helping the people of Taiwan acknowledge that the political association of Taiwan with the United States, initiated by the FSM, best serves the interests of the Taiwanese people; also, helping American people acknowledge and realize that the incorporation of Taiwan into the American Union best serves the national interests of the United States.
9B-02 Launching the PPSC Project, with online signatures/operation being the first phase.
9B-03 Presenting petitions to the U.S. Congress by the leadership of the FSM and the representatives of the people of Taiwan randomly selected from the pool of people who signed their petitions. The petitions will be presented respectively when one hundred thousand, two hundred fifty thousand, half a million, one million, two million, five million, and ten million signatures have been collected.
9B-04 Lobbying the U.S. Congress to enact a series of laws that acknowledge and recognize the right of the Taiwanese people to self-determination under international law and that provide a mechanism and framework of plebiscite for the people of Taiwan.
9B-05 Conducting lobbying activities to get the endorsements of the U.S. government for plebiscites in Taiwan at times when both Washington and the people of Taiwan deem appropriate or opportune.
9C Organizations & Leaders
9C-01 In order to promote the cause of the FSM and push through the PPSC Project, the FSM established or to set up the following organizations:
9C-01a The Formosa Territory Commission (FTC), under which a Planning Committee on the Establishment of a Territorial Commonwealth of Formosa and the Pescadores in Political Union with the United States (The Planning Committee) is to be organized; and
9C-01b The Task Force on Plebiscite Petition Signatures Collection for a Formosa Territory in the American Union (The Task Force).
9C-02 Leaders of Organizations
9C-02a Dr. Chung-mo Cheng
Current Positions:
Chairman, Taiwan Law & Policy Research Foundation
Chairman, Taiwan Administrative Law Association
Chairman, European Union Study Association-Taiwan
Chairman, The Formosa Territory Commission (Not officially announced yet)
Education:
Post-doctoral Research Scholar, University of Wisconsin, U.S.A., 1971
LL.D., University of Vienna, Austria, 1970
Research Scholar, University of Tokyo, Japan, 1967
LL.M., Waseda University, Japan, 1966
LL.B., Soochow University, 1962
Experience:
Chairman, Formosa National Legal strategy Association (Party), 2009-2012;
Chairman, Friends of Lee Teng-Hui Association Formosa, 2008-;
Chairman, European Union Study Association-Taiwan, 2008-;
Chairman, Taiwan Law & Policy Research Foundation, 2007-;
Chairman, Taiwan Administrative Law Association, 2005-2011;
Vice-President, Judicial Yuan, 1999-2007;
Minister, Ministry of Justice, 1998-99;
Grand Justice, Judicial Yuan, 1994-98;
Commissioner, Examination Yuan, 1990-94;
Commissioner, Taiwan Provincial Government, 1982-90;
Guest Professor, University of Vienna, Austria, 1980-81;
Professor and Dean, Graduate School of Law, National Chunghsing University, 1979-82;
Professor and Chairman, Department of Law, National Chunghsing University, 1977-79;
Professor and Chairman, Department of Law, Fuhsingkang College, 1973-77;
Section Chief, Senior Specialist, and Advisor, Executive Yuan, 1971-73
Publications:
"Basic Theory of Administrative Law" (1991);
"Essay of Compensational Law System" (1986);
"Collection of Administrative Laws I" (1990);
"Administrative Law in the Past 40 Years" (1990);
"The General Legal Principles of the Administrative Law" (editor, 2 vols.) (1994,1997);
"Selected Hundred Sentences of the Administrative Law" (editor) (1997);
"New Tendency of the Administrative Law Development in 21th Century"(2001)
9C-02b Mr. David C. Chou
Education:
National Taipei University (formerly National Chunghsing University), College of Law and Commerce, Dept. of Law, LLB;
Pennsylvania State University Dickinson Law School, LLM;
Advanced Research Program, New York University Law School
Careers:
General Manager, Chenchang Plastic Co.;
General Manager & President, Flywitch Co. (Taiwan & California);
Assistant to Legislator Ninghsiang Kang;
Executive Secretary, Yunlin County Committee, DPP;
Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement
Coordinator, The Task Force on Plebiscite Petition Signatures Collection for a Formosa Territory in the American Union (The Task Force)
Publications:
"Say Yes to America" (1998);
"American Dream" (to be published);
"The Education of David Chou" (to be published);
"Collections of Papers and Documents" (to be published)
9D The Formosa Statehood Movement and Its Founder
Any hurried admission to the temple of freedom would be unwise, any forced admission would be contradiction in terms, unthinkable, revolting. But a duty lay on the people of the United States to admit all qualified applicants freely. (This was Manifest Destiny in its pure form: peaceful, automatic, gradual, and governed by self-determination.)
— Frederik Merk: Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History
With no regrets, we're determined to build an American Universal State on the values of freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, clean government, market economy, open society, racial equality, social justice, and upward mobility. This is Manifest Destiny with a new and enlightened definition.
— David C. Chou, Founder of the Formosa Statehood Movement
Nearly a century and a half after Commodore Matthew C. Perry and his contemporaries' occupation and settlement plans for Taiwan, the standard of the Formosa Statehood Movement (FSM) was finally raised by David C. Chou, an American-educated Formosan.
David Chou and his comrades set up the 51st Club of Taiwan and started the FSM in 1994. The Club is believed to be the first indigenous civic group of its kind to promote the cause of Formosan statehood in the Union.
David Chou was born in Taiwan in 1949, the year Chiang Kai-shek occupied Taiwan and set up his government-in-exile on this island. He received his Bachelor of Law degree from the National Taipei University (formerly National Chunghsing University) and Master of Comparative Law degree from Dickinson Law School, Pennsylvania State University.
Mr. Chou was actively involved in the Taiwan Independence Movement in his late thirties. Later on, he found that most residents on Taiwan did not want to risk their lives declaring de jure independence, nor did they favor so-called "unification with China," placing their hard-won democracy, freedoms, and higher standard of living in jeopardy. He therefore came up with a new approach — integration into the American Union — as a Third Option.
Mr. Chou believes his plan will create maximum benefits for the Formosan people and Americans as well. For this same reason, he argues, his proposition will prove to be a popular, workable, pragmatic, peaceful — indeed ideal solution.
The Formosa Statehood Movement outright rejects any form of political association with China and urges that any independent nation-building project must give way to the statehood plan, or the Formosan people will find themselves, in the near future, facing very grave dangers in the wake of Communist China's meteoric rise to great-power status, fueled by a massive transfer of wealth from the United States and Western Europe via astronomical trade deficits that pump hundreds of billions of dollars a year into the treasury of Communist China, to be used for whatever purposes the Butchers of Beijing may choose.
The Formosa Statehood Movement offers a pragmatic "2-phase Taiwan-U.S. Integration Project" to the general public of Taiwan. In each stage, a set of necessary measures are to be taken to draw Taiwan closer to America in terms of values and systems.
Phase 1: Taiwan as a Territorial Commonwealth in the American Union
The Formosa Statehood Movement advocates that the U.S. Government and the people on Taiwan work together to make Taiwan a U.S. territory like Puerto Rico or the Northern Mariana Islands, making Taiwan a self-governing territory of the United States, through a plebiscite to be held at such time as the U.S. Government may deem appropriate.
Phase 2: Taiwan as a State of the United States
The Formosa Statehood Movement calls for full membership in the Union for Taiwan as the final and best solution to Taiwan's status problem.
The Formosan populace, we believe, will not be completely satisfied with the "Commonwealth" status for very long, because they will eventually appreciate that only with full membership in the Union can they enjoy full representation in the U.S. Congress, full vote for President, and political power commensurate with their economic strength.
Predicably, the future State of Formosa will rank top three in the American family in terms of the size of its population and economy. Taiwan as a State of the United States will have 2 senators and about 33 representatives to voice the will, aspirations, and needs of its residents. It's solid middle-class values of self-help, the need for education, and the overarching importance of family will resonate with the bulk of Americans and reinforce the best values of American civilization.
9E Cementing the Tie
Cementing the Tie
When most people first hear the suggestion that Taiwan should
become a State of the Union, their first thought is, "Won't that cause enormous problems with China?" By "China", they mean "Mainland" or "Communist" China. There's another way of thinking about this: that it will bring China and the United States closer, both literally and figuratively.
Geographically, Taiwan's accession to the Union would end the uncertainty about its future, not just in the minds of the people of Taiwan, but also in the mind of the government of China. China has a lot of problems. It doesn't need a Taiwan problem on top of all its other problems. The instant Taiwan becomes the 51st State, that instant does Taiwan become one less thing for Beijing to worry about or plan for. No invasion to have to prepare; no risk of an ill-considered attack blowing up into World War III. The government of mainland China can simply put that aside and look for the positives. And there will be plenty of positives to find.
Taiwan as part of the United States would become the commercial go-between that the United States needs to sell American goods, including Taiwan-made goods, on the Chinese mainland. Millions of Chinese-speaking Taiwanese are available from whom to recruit salesmen to speak to the ordinary Chinese citizen in his own language about the qualities that make U.S.-manufactured goods, or U.S. services, a good choice.
Taiwanese engineers and quality-control officers could make sure that such manufacturing operations as the U.S. conducts on the Chinese mainland meet strict U.S. standards for safety, and conformity with specs. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration would have a ready source of inspectors of pharmaceutical and food plants in China, as would the Consumer Product Safety Commission have inspectors in toy factories and the like. Such Taiwanese inspectors, fluent in Chinese, could converse with the man or woman on the production line to gather what could be crucial information to guarantee that no lead-based paint is used on toys for small children, no food or beverage is contaminated with melamine or watered down as to render its nutritional value below safety levels. (13 infants in China died from malnutrition from that cause.) [Link to include: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki2008_Chinese_ milk_scandal]
Most Americans of Chinese ancestry lose their family's language within two generations, and really aren't interested in learning it as a foreign language to serve in the U.S.-China trade and cultural and diplomatic relationships. Taiwanese either already have the language or are far more likely to be willing to learn another language (like Cantonese) to secure their future.
China stands as well to gain substantially from Taiwanese talent scouts, literary agents, and translators, including writers of subtitles and dubbers of voices, who could find worthy cultural materials on the mainland and make them accessible to Americans. At present, the trade in intellectual property is almost wholly one-way, FROM the United States TO mainland China (including Chinese piracy of U.S. films, music, and the like). Surely there must be things of cultural and intellectual value going on in China that the U.S. would like. Think of the enormous demand for entertainment and information posed by U.S. cable systems of hundreds of channels whose schedules are 90% or more just reruns of old syndicated American TV shows, some of them decades old.
Running 24 hours a day, a U.S. cable system of 180 channels (not even counting premium channels like HBO and Starz) use up 4,320 hours of programming a day. Multiply that by 365 days, and you see that a 180-channel system uses up 1,576,800 hours of programming every year! Consider as well that if half of that programming were in the form of half-hour shows, that means 788,400 of those hours would actually constitute 1,576,800 separate programs for that half, plus the other 788,400 hours of hour-long programs = 2,365,200 programs each and every year.
The U.S. television and film industry can't fill all that time, certainly not at the production costs that obtain in the United States. Might they be able to fill a lot more of it thru production centers in China? Surely so. And there are Chinese acrobats and New Wave rock groups and dancers and circus performers and variety shows, plus martial-arts movies and perhaps even Chinese soap operas that could be shown on some U.S. cable channels. Wouldn't the Chinese government welcome such production jobs (electricians, sound engineers, cameramen, caterers) in China-based American film and TV production facilities, and exports of China's own cultural productions to American audiences? I should think they would.
Certainly some extreme nationalists on the mainland would be furious at the idea of China's 'lost province' being permanently put beyond China's sovereign reach. The same people would be extremely uncomfortable with the United States becoming a greater player in East and Southeast Asia. How important are such people and such views in China's policymaking elite? Are the empire-builders who see China as the natural center of the universe — the Middle Kingdom around which all the rest of the world should revolve — mere throwbacks, few in number and scant in influence? Or are they in charge of Chinese policy?
Plainly there are people in China who don't want another "American Century". They want the 21st Century to be "the Chinese Century". But plainly those people do NOT presently control policy, because China is so heavily invested in the United States — news reports in March 2009 say that China holds $700 billion in U.S. Treasury bonds — and so deeply affected by U.S. difficulties, that the present U.S. downturn has caused severe dislocations within China, and even riots by workers of plants shut down because U.S. consumption of Chinese goods is down.
Realists in China know, and accept, that China cannot take care of its own people without a constructive relationship with the Unite States. Some of those realists now also must understand that "beggar thy neighbor" means disaster for China. Stealing all those millions of jobs from American workers did not produce permanent prosperity for China. It subverted the U.S. economy and contributed to the present near-catastrophe across the entire interrelated world of international trade — of which China is a huge part. When the U.S. hurts, China hurts. When the U.S. prospers, China prospers. Surely that understanding can be popularized across Chinese society — if we can reach Chinese society.
The issue then becomes, does it matter, in Communist China, what people in general think? Or are the people so powerless that only the views of the power elite matter?
That leads to the further issue of what influence can the United States have, at its present size or with Taiwan added, to promote the right of the people of China to be heard and their concerns heeded?
It is a truism of common sense that friends have more influence than have enemies. Criticisms from enemies produce indignant, defensive animus, and may make hostility more entrenched and aggressive, and drive a person, or country, in the opposite direction, to justify whatever is criticized, not accept it as a constructive suggestion of what they would be wise to do.
Criticisms from friends, gently issued with the intent of helping, however, may produce changes in the direction suggested. For instance, if someone you detest says, "You are fat and disgusting! You should hide in your house and never come out," you are not likely to see that as incentive to lose weight. But what if a dear friend says, "I'm very worried about you. Your weight has gotten out of control, and can subvert your health, even shorten your life. Why don't you come with me to my gym and see if a moderate exercise program can improve the quality of your life, increase your energy, and help you lose weight, feel better, and look better?"
The United States and China are now separated by the largest ocean in the world, geographically. There is also an ocean of difference in our histories and cultures. China is important to the U.S. The U.S. is important to China — and never more than now. Even in the days of horror during WWII, when the U.S. was trying to help China fight off Japan, but couldn't actually do very much within China, good feeling between our two countries didn't matter as much as it does now.
Taiwan can be not an irritant that drives the U.S. and China further apart, but an intermediary that brings us closer, latter-day Flying Tigers. It's all in how you see it, and how you present the case to the parties involved.
The hawks and empire-builders in Beijing have had their say. Now it's time to reach the Chinese man and woman in the street, the academics, the businessmen, the cultural and economic realists, the moderates who understand that the sun shines on each country independently, and you need not wish foul weather on others to enjoy the sun yourself. China need not resent the success of the United States, especially if they can piggyback their future on the prosperity of a great American friend.
The United States with Taiwan can make that case better than can the United States without Taiwan. So let's work enthusiastically and without reservations to bring Taiwan into the Union, for a bigger, better, and more effective United States, and a closer and more constructive relationship with China.
L. Craig Schoonmaker, Chairman of the Expansionist Party of the United States (http://www.ExpansionistParty.org); "The Expansionist" (http://antipost.blogspot.com)
9F A Great Cause and Mission
A Great Cause and Mission: A Plea to the Pro-Independence Formosan Americans and their Descendants
Can Taiwan become a state in the United States of America? Absolutely, yes! It is entirely up to the people of Taiwan and the U.S. We believe this endeavor for the statehood is most advantageous for all residents of Taiwan and Formosan Americans as well, regardless of their origin and race. We hope to prove to our fellow Formosan Americans here that the Formosan statehood plan is indeed a much more intelligent move than the Taiwanese nationhood plan.
1. The promotion of Taiwan's statehood in the Union enables Taiwan to directly influence U.S. policy including improving US-Taiwan relations. The beneficial effects on Taiwan can be almost immediate, as soon as a significant statehood movement is established. This is because logically the U.S. will support Taiwan more vigorously as a potential state, at least until the entire statehood process is played out. Even if the statehood is repeatedly rejected, the improved US-Taiwan relations developed in the interim will likely persist. On the other hand, the promotion of Taiwanese independence involves U.S. only indirectly by appealing to lofty ideals such as democratic values and principles.
2. The promotion of statehood appeals to U.S. self-interest by offering to share Taiwan's commercial and strategic advantages, whereas Taiwanese independence appeals to lofty ideals such as democratic principles, which do not benefit the U.S. that much. The shifting of the focus of U.S. political support over past decades, from the KMT regime (Chinese Nationalist Party) in Taiwan to the communist regime in China, is the result of shifting of the focus of U.S. self-interest. The main U.S. focus now is China's fertile trade potential for U.S. corporations. When financial considerations are of paramount importance, human rights and other related issues usually take a backseat. But Taiwan may attract even more U.S. attention and support by offering to become an integral part of U.S.
3. The interest in statehood advances Taiwan's Territorial security by seeking direct US-Taiwan security cooperation, whereas Taiwanese independence seeks U.S. security protection by appealing to lofty ideals, which might be offset by the U.S. interests in China. The greatest advantage of statehood over Taiwanese independence is the certainty of U.S. military protection of Taiwan. It is logical that the U.S. will provide very vigorous military support to Taiwan during the statehood process; for Taiwan's proven strategic importance; for the desperate need of military bases in the western Pacific region; for the obligation to maintain the security of Taiwan at all times until the statehood issue is settled: all for the self-interest of the U.S.
4. Pursuing statehood prevents Taiwan from becoming a pawn in US-China strategic trade-off. China has obviously been playing a game of strengthening her bargaining positions for strategic trade-off with U.S. for eventual elimination of U.S. military support to Taiwan, whether independent or not. "Did you say China should stop activities such as weapon sales and transfer of missile and nuclear technologies to terrorist-sponsoring countries like Iran and North Korea? Fine, then let the U.S. stop military support to Taiwan." Such trade-off will be far less likely when the strategic advantages of Taiwan and U.S. can become one and the same through the pursuit of statehood.
5. The pursuit of statehood enables Taiwan to avoid the increasing pressure to negotiate with China from an inferior position. This is so-called "peaceful unification." But Taiwan, independent or not, can only negotiate with China, not as a nation, but as something equivalent to a province of China only. The issue of statehood will obliterate Taiwan's need to negotiate with China at all, because this is an endeavor for US-statehood, not Chinese-statehood.
6. The statehood plan accomplishes far more by avoiding the taboo word "independence." The word has reached taboo status not only to Beijing and Washington, but also to the residents of Taiwan, who, although politically independence-minded, have reluctantly opted to maintain the status quo instead, just to avoid confronting the taboo word. For us, to repeat that taboo word can be counter-productive. Actually it is wise not to and there is no need at all. As far as China is concerned Taiwan, in any name, is already independent. The original intention of the promotion of Taiwanese independence is to unite the residents of Taiwan to topple the KMT alien regime. But it now moves to free Taiwan from China's annexation of the island and to stop the political agenda of the pro-unification PFP (People First Party)and KMT. The pursuit of can do the job effectively, if not far better, because it is essentially incompatible with China's domination over Taiwan and PFP-KMT coalition's drive for "unification."
7. The pursuit of statehood internationalizes the "Taiwan issue." China has always been attempting to isolate and marginalize Taiwan, whether independent or not, by claiming that this is an internal matter of China. And although Taiwan has been trying to break out of this stranglehold by attempting to join international organizations such as the United Nations, she has encountered increasing difficulties because of China's restless interference. The statehood plan will enable Taiwan to transcend China's veto power, to negotiate directly with the U.S., and to participate in international affairs through the United States.
8. The statehood plan enables Taiwan to dissociate completely from the Chinese civil war. China has been using "to finish off the civil war" as an excuse for her aggressive stance toward Taiwan. But most of the residents of Taiwan have nothing to do with that war. The persisting political problems for the residents of Taiwan are the direct results of the pro-China parties' claim that Taiwan is part of China. Although KMT regime was toppled, the sovereign nation of Taiwan, in whatever name, will always be seen by China as a "renegade province," ready to be attacked and restored. In other words, "one China, one Taiwan" will never be good enough for China. "One China, one US-Taiwan" may still be not good enough for China, but she may run out of "civil war" excuses against Taiwan, and may be forced to accept the new reality because of the presence of U.S. as an active player. While the process of Taiwan's US-statehood is still ongoing, attacking Taiwan means attacking the United States. Therefore, instead of promoting independence, it would be wiser for the innocent Taiwanese people to hasten affiliation with the U.S. to indicate her rejection of both parties to the Chinese civil war, and will have nothing to do with that war in the future.
9. The pursuit of statehood, as some previous polls showed, appeals to most residents of Taiwan, whatever their background, and whether they support Taiwan independence or not, simply because it is very attractive to be American citizens. Even pro-China or pro-independence leaders and activists hold US green cards or citizenship, and own real estate and have bank accounts in the United States, not mentioning whatever their offspring are doing here on a permanent basis. The ordinary residents of Taiwan can only dream about becoming American citizens and this becomes clear through the polling that took place.
10. The issue of statehood assures wider worldsupport. Most countries will likely support Taiwan's formal association with the United States, not only for democratic principles, but for their own self-interest. A strong and lasting U.S. military presence in East Asia has stabilizing effects due to the new balance of power in the region. On the other hand, an independent Taiwan will most likely be seen as only a temporary situation because the threat from China will always be there, not only to the independent Taiwan, but also to neighboring countries themselves. A China with military bases in Taiwan will be a devastating threat to all remaining nations there indeed.
11. The pursuit of statehood is the best gambit against China's military threat against Taiwan. No matter how long Taiwan has been independent, China has the option to wait until the most opportune moment to invade the diplomatically isolated Taiwan. And so the issue of statehood will hasten an US-China military showdown, if one occurs at all, because China's military options will then be limited to the period before Taiwan's jumping onto the trail of a US-Taiwan integration process. But for the foreseeable future, it is unlikely to see the US-China military showdown, because it is far more advantageous for Taiwan and the U.S. to go to war with China now when Taiwan's military defenses are still intact and U.S. still has the upper hand militarily, even in Asia. A brilliant strategic move against the Chinese expansionists indeed.
12. The promotion of statehood offers a new approach to this situation, whereas the promotion of Taiwanese independence is basically the same old strategy. Whatever the significance of President Bush's announcement about not supporting Taiwanese independence, it indicates some weakness in the old strategy of promoting Taiwanese independence as the political weapon against the China threat. It also indicates the danger of losing American support if Taiwanese independence is continuously promoted. This is indeed the time for a new strategy to provide a long-term security umbrella for Taiwan, to calm the residents of Taiwan, to help them snap out of the complacence of political status quo, to help Taiwan break away from increasing isolation, to take advantage of the new momentum for change, and to seize the new opportunity to move forward.
It is necessary to reiterate the important point that the benefits of promoting statehood for Taiwan are practically immediate and persisting, and they are not contingent on the successful outcome of becoming a state of the United States. In other words, the pursuit of statehood has the advantage over Taiwanese independence at whatever stages of its development. This is because the U.S. will provide Taiwan with special considerations as soon as the potential of the statehood is established. Therefore, we cannot use the uncertainty of the final outcome as an excuse for not promoting statehood.
If the statehood is such a great idea, why haven't we vigorously promoting it and, instead, waste our precious resources and energy in the Taiwan Independence Movement for the past half century? We believe the following may be the reasons:
(1) Our romantic desire for the "Republic of Taiwan." It is natural for people to desire to have their own nation, president, anthem, flag, and all that, rather than just becoming the 51st state, no matter how great the U.S. is. But be realistic and pragmatic. If Taiwan is militarily unable to defend herself on her own, it would be more intelligent for her to be part of a democratic, prosperous, and strong America now, than insisting on nationhood now and to be conquered and annexed later by the neighboring giant bully which is autocratic, repressive, chauvinistic, and economically backward. Let us make a wise choice now while we still have the freedom to choose.
2) Our unrealistic overconfidence in the effectiveness of Taiwanese independence against imperialist China. The promotion of Taiwanese nationhood was very effective in rallying popular support for the purpose of toppling the KMT alien regime. But the KMT was merely an antiquated and anachronistic political phenomenon in Taiwan. Given a proper initiative like nationhood, the residents of Taiwan could vote the KMT candidates out of positions of power, practically wholesale. But the expansionist China is an entirely different animal. Using only the promotion of Taiwanese nationhood against the threat of China's inroad is obviously inadequate. The once pro-Taipei Bush administration's several announcements disfavoring Taiwanese independence could serve as wake-up calls for all who have indulged in promoting Taiwanese nationhood exclusively.
(3) Our blindness to the grossly unfavorable position of an independent Taiwan. Like it or not, the new reality is that China is already a world power, at least regionally, and at least capable of bullying Taiwan seriously. China is also autocratic and expansionistic. It is totally unrealistic to believe that an independent Taiwan, even with US military support, will be allowed to coexist peacefully with Nazi China----the New Evil Empire----side by side.