11A-04華府的「一中政策」(「我們美國的一個中國政策」)的內涵

(4/11/2015張貼)

 

[當美國政府提起「一中政策」時，它總是說"our 'one-China' policy"(「我們美國的一個中國政策」)。這是"a diplomatic term of art"，也就是「具有特殊意涵的外交名詞」。第一，它不是「一中原則」，它是「一中政策」。第二，它不是臺北或中國國民黨政權所指的「一中原則」，也不是北京所指的「一中原則」。第三，它有幾個意涵，其中一個就是「台灣不屬於中國」。]

 

一

 

住在北加州的台美人謝鎮寬先生於4/9/2015在英文「臺北時報」投書，標題是:“DPP’s ‘one China’ policy?” (民進黨的一中政策？)。由於他探討了「一中政策」這個重要的問題，所以台灣建州運動今天就藉機會再度來探討「一中政策」。

 

對於台灣建州運動而言，「一個中國」可能只是一個我們可與北京討論的議題，也就是說，對我們而言，所謂的「一個中國」根本達不到「一個中國政策」的層次，當然也就更達不到「一個中國原則」的層次。

 

對於台灣建州運動而言，台灣是台灣，中國是中國，這是完全互不隸屬的兩個地理區域與政治實體，倘若我們有一天也要與北京開始談「一個中國」的議題，那已可說北京是在邀請我們干涉中國的內政了。

 

二

 

美國是有它自己的「一中政策」，在若干年前，建州運動為了釐清若干問題，所以發表了兩篇文章，它們是:

 

(1)3/31/2008發表的「馬英九當選後新形勢下的『台灣建州運動』」，

 

(2)4/10/2008發表的「馬英九執政後新形勢下的台灣建州運動(一)」。

 

在「馬英九當選後新形勢下的『台灣建州運動』」一文的第三章，我們釐清了「美國的一中政策」，詮釋了它的內涵。

 

現在我們請台灣與台美鄉親來參閱這一章:

 

第三章:美國的台海兩岸政策與「一中政策」

 

// 凱利助卿在前述的國會證詞中，也指出美國的核心政策，它們是:

 

(1)美國仍然對奠基於「美中三公報」與「台灣關係法」之上的「一中政策」有承諾，

 

(2)美國不支持台獨，美國不支持會單方改變美國所定義的「台海現狀」的行動，

 

(3)對北京而言，這意指不得對台灣使用武力或威脅要對台灣使用武力，對臺北而言，它意指必須在經營台海兩岸關係的所有層面時，均必須審慎，對台海兩岸而言，它意指任何一方均不得以任何言行，來片面改變台灣的地位，

 

(4)美國將繼續根據「台灣關係法」，把適當的防衛性軍事裝備賣給台灣，

 

(5)美國把對台使用武力一事視為嚴重關切，因此，美國將維持其能力，以便抵抗對台灣使用武力或對台灣進行其他任何形式的脅迫。

 

凱利上面這一段話告訴我們，美國有它的「一中政策」，而且「一中政策」還是美國的核心政策，他這段話也讓我們瞭解美國的台海兩岸政策的內含。

 

2006年，國務卿萊斯在美國國會表示:美國對台海兩岸的政策包括「一個中國政策」、「美中三項公報」、「台灣關係法」，這是一個不可分割的配套。

 

近年來，美國政府一再宣示的美國台海兩岸政策是:「台灣不獨、中國不武、台海不戰、台海任何一方不得片面改變現狀」，美國以此政策加上它有執行此政策之意願與實力，因而得以維護它在台海所建立的秩序。

 

什麼是「美國的一中政策」?

 

2004年2月6日，當時的國務院東亞事務副助卿薛瑞福 (Randall G. Schriver) 在「美中經濟與安全審查委員會」舉辦的聽證會上說，「我們美國自己的一中政策」具有幾個要素:

 

(1)美中三公報，

 

(2)台灣關係法，

 

(3)反對使用武力(即台海問題必須和平解決)，

 

(4)不支持台灣獨立，與

 

(5)對台的「六項保證」。

 

「六項保證」中有兩項十分重要:

 

(1)美國不對台灣施加壓力，不迫使台灣與中國談判，

 

(2)美國不改變關於台灣主權的立場，亦即美國不接受中國對台灣的主權主張。

 

我們現在來看看「美中三項公報」怎麼說:

 

(1)在1972年「美中第一份上海公報」中，美國方面聲明:「美國認知台海兩岸所有中國人均主張只有一個中國而且台灣是中國的一部分，美國政府不挑戰此項立場，它重申中國人自己和平解決台灣問題之利益。」

 

(2)1979年「美中建交公報」說:「美中兩國重申上海公報之原則----------美國政府認知中國方面只有一個中國且台灣為中國一部分之立場」。

 

(3)在1982年「美中第二份上海公報」中，美國政府重申:「它無意侵犯中國主權與領土完整或幹預中國內政或追求兩個中國或一中一台之政策」。

 

在法律與外交術語中，認知與承認截然不同，我們現在來看看「認知」的意含。

 

(1)1979年，美國參議院對245號決議案的附加意見說:「美國政府已表示，它承認中華人民共和國為中國的唯一合法政府，它也已認知中國所持台灣是中國的一部分的立場，但美國本身並未同意此一立場」。

 

(2)1983年11月9日，眾議院外交委員會針對參議院第74號決議案的附加意見舉辦聽證會，其中有一項證詞說:「認知」一詞是經過審慎考量、特別選定的，也是依循1972年「上海公報」的相同措辭，這個用語意謂注意到--------但不必然同意---------中國的立場。

 

這也就是說，在「美中三公報」中，美國政府都沒有接受及承認中國對台灣的主權主張。// [第三章結束]

 

三

 

我們接著請鄉親們來閱讀謝先生的大作，我們請大家讀的是漢譯本 ，至於原文英文版則放在附錄一中:

 

民進黨的一中政策？DPP’s ‘one China’ policy?

[轉載自:臺北時報]

http://taiwanus.net/news/press/2015/201504091628241039.htm

[謝鎮寬]於2015-04-09 16:04:04上傳[ ]

 

民進黨的一中政策？

 

//4月3日，民進黨秘書長吳釗燮過境舊金山，並與舊金山灣區台灣同鄉們餐敘。他向與會鄉親們報告，這次是身為民進黨駐美正式代表，例行定期到華府的訪問。

 

他指出，作為一個代表理當長駐華府，但因他同時也是民進黨秘書長的雙重身份，所以只能大約每兩個月一次，或當有特殊必要時才走訪。

 

他向出席餐會鄉親說，這次是一個非常有成效的訪問，按原有規劃見到想見的人，而且交換意見。

他說，民進黨有很多的中國政策，但其中就是沒有所謂的「九二共識」。

 

然而，一個有關中國的問題被提出：

 

目前有三個熟知名的「一中」政策 –

 

1）中國說，世上只有一個中國，中華人民共和國是唯一的合法政府，台灣是中國的一部分;

 

2）ROC說，世上只有一個中國，中華民國是唯一的合法政府，台灣是中國的一部分;

 

3）美國也說，世上只有一個中國，中華人民共和國是唯一被承認的政府，但台灣不是中國的一部分，那請問民進黨的一中政策是什麼？

 

吳釗燮精靈地向提問者說，最近柯文哲市長有提到一中，也應該算進出，所以世上有很多很多的一中政策。

 

但民進黨不在乎有多少一中政策，只相信台灣人民擁有台灣主權，而且台灣已經是一個主權獨立的國家。

 

噯，這樣的答覆，對於一些鑽研舊金山和約多年的台美鄉親們，確實是一大困惑，為什麼吳秘書長要虧柯文哲的一中政策：承認世上只有一個中國，所以它不是一個問題。難不成還有其他的中國？顯然，吳釗燮或民進黨有其他更好的方式，來詮釋台灣現況。也許他的答覆是正確，世上有成千上萬的一中政策。但是，因有可能成為台灣的執政當局，民進黨當然有必要，公佈他們的一中政策，和對台灣現況的認知；所謂的只能做不能說，就是黑箱作業，已礙難接受。

 

事實上，柯市長所提的一中政策，是一個非常有建設性的觀點。當他被問到一國兩制時，他回答說，為什麼不是兩國一制，當然是指普世價值的民主制度。

 

當問他關於一個中國政策，他說，這不是一個問題，因為只世上有一個中國，被國際社會如美國所承認。

 

一個中國政策，自上海公報簽簽署後，一再被重複引述，也成為美國國務院所遵循，與中國交往的堅定外交政策。它註明，在台灣海峽兩邊的所有中國人，都承認同意世上只有一個中國，並獲得中華人民共和國與中華民國所接受，因為他們都是中國人。吳釗燮是台灣人，為什麼要反對呢？

 

身為一個台灣人，我們應該樂見，中華人民共和國與中華民國把手言歡，一笑泯恩仇。

 

中華民國自1949年，被中華人民共和國踢出中國亡命台灣，算算已經超過半個世紀。現在該是中華民國回中國老家，讓台灣自己當家作主的時候。中華民國從未擁有過台灣主權，這些年來他們長期留住台灣，那些自認為是中華民國的中國人，應該要感恩台灣人的熱情好客。

 

有道是嚼果子拜樹頭，嚼米飯拜田園，當知飲水思源。這些在台灣卻自認是中國人者，請高抬貴手，還給台灣人民自主的生存空間。

 

所以，吳釗燮沒有權利，也沒有義務去替中國背負內戰的十字架。台灣不是中國的一部分。中華民國的中國人，在1949年是以戰敗難民身份亡命台灣，現在海峽兩邊的中國人，已經像兄弟般地和好，該是讓他們回家團圓的時候。台灣不是中國的領土，台灣終久要屬於台灣人民。

 

那麼，民進黨兩岸對談的底線是什麼？中國國民黨是屬於中國的政黨，不是台灣，這正是為什麼他們總是要，堅持捏造的九二共識。除非民進黨也是中國的政黨，否則就不要再自欺欺人。

 

台灣真的不是中華民國，中華民國也不是台灣。現在該是讓我們來附議美國的中國政策時候，在美中三個聯合公報（針對中華人民共和國和中華民國），和台灣關係法（針對美國與台灣）的規範下，務實認知，世上只有一個中國，但台灣不是中國的一部分。

謝鎮寬

加州海沃//

 

四

 

關於「一個中國」這個問題，最完整的與最權威的參考資料應屬「美國國會研究處」(Congressional Research Service)的資深研究員、亞洲安全事務的專家簡淑賢(Shirley A. Kan)所編纂的China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei (‘https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30341.pdf)。

 

Shirley每隔一段時間，就會update資料，她最近做update的工作是在 2014年10月10日，有興趣使用她所蒐集的材料進行研究的鄉親，不妨自行前往。

 

五

 

在阿扁執政期間，台灣的外交部委託當時在「傳統基金會」擔任研究員的譚慎格(John J. Tkacik, Jr.)對「美國的一個中國政策」進行廣泛與深入的研究，「傳統基金會」曾將譚慎格的研究成果出版成冊 ，建州運動也擁有一本。

 

由於譚慎格對這個問題有深入的研究，所以我們把他發表的一篇論文放在附錄二，有興趣一讀的鄉親讀完，一定會覺得很有幫助。

 

在附錄三，我們張貼了費浩偉(Harvey Feldman)談「美國的一個中國政策」的文章。在卡特政府與台灣的蔣介石政權斷交後，他奉命起草「台灣關係法」，卡特行政團隊送給國會討論、但被國會大修的那個原始版本就是他起草的，這個版本建築在「台灣法律地位未定」(亦即「台灣不屬於中國」)的基礎上，也是行政部門與立法部門的共識。

 

台灣建州運動發起人周威霖

David C. Chou

Founder, Formosa Statehood Movement

(an organization devoted in current stage to making Taiwan a territorial commonwealth of the United States)

=================================================

附錄一

DPP’s ‘one China’ policy?

[ LETTER ]

By John Hsieh

TAIPEI TIMES

Fri, Apr 10, 2015 - Page 8　

http://www.taipeitimes.com/…/archiv…/2015/04/10/2003615558/2

On Friday last week, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Secretary-General Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) stopped over in San Francisco and had a dinner meeting with the San Francisco Bay Area Taiwanese community. He shared with the audience stories from his routine business trip to Washington as an official representative of the party.

He said that as a representative, he is supposed to stay in Washington consistently, but with his position as secretary-general, he can only visit about once every two months or whenever it is necessary.

He said it was a productive trip to meet people and exchange messages.

He said the DPP has plenty of China policies, but none of them are the so-called “1992 consensus.”

A question about China was raised: There are three known “one China” policies: First, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) says there is only “one China,” it is the sole recognized government and Taiwan is part of China; second, the Republic of China (ROC) says there is only “one China,” it is the sole recognized government and Taiwan is part of China; third, the US says there is only “one China,” the PRC is the sole recognized government and Taiwan is not part of China. What is the DPP’s “one China” policy?

Wu teased the questioner saying that there is one more policy: From Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je (柯文哲), who said: There is only “one China” and it should be added — one too many.

The DPP does not care how many Chinas there are, but believes Taiwanese sovereignty is owned by its people and the nation is already independent.

So it was puzzling for those in the audience who have studied the San Francisco Peace Treaty why Wu brought up Ko’s “one China” policy. Obviously Wu or the DPP has a better way to interpret the “status quo.” Maybe he is right and there are thousands of “one China” policies. However, as a potential governing party, the DPP needs to announce its policy and define the “status quo.”

Ko provides a constructive view of the “one China” policy. When asked about the “one country, two systems” idea, he said: Why not “two counties, one system?” Of course, the system he meant was the universal value of democracy.

When he was asked about the “one China” policy, he said it is not an issue because there is only “one China” recognized by the international community.

The “one China” policy has been repeated since the Shanghai Communique was signed and respected by the US Department of State as the firm foreign policy with which to deal with China. It specifies that all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait agree that there is only “one China,” which has been agreed to and accepted by both the ROC and the PRC, because they are Chinese. Wu is Taiwanese, so why does he oppose it?

As Taiwanese, we should be more than happy to see the two nations shaking hands and forgetting past betrayals and thoughts of revenge with a laugh.

It has been more than half a century since the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) was kicked out by the Chinese Communist Party and fled to Taiwan in 1949. It is time for the ROC to go home to China and leave Taiwan alone. The ROC never owned Taiwanese sovereignty and all ROC adherents should appreciate the hospitality they have been shown all the years of their long stay in the nation.

“Worship a tree while eating its fruit, worship farms while eating rice. We need to remember the source when drinking water.”

Those in Taiwan who identify as Chinese, please have a heart and leave the nation alone.

Wu does not have the right or any need to carry the cross of civil war for China. Taiwan is not part of China. The ROC is Chinese who escaped to Taiwan as refugees in 1949 because they were defeated, but now Chinese on both sides are like brothers; it is time for them to have a reunion. Taiwan is not Chinese territory, it belongs to Taiwanese.

What is the bottom line in the DPP’s cross-strait negotiations? The KMT is a political party of China, not Taiwan, that is why it always hides behind the fabricated “1992 consensus.” Unless the DPP is also a political party of China, it should stop deceiving itself.

Taiwan is not the ROC, and the ROC is not Taiwan. It is time to endorse the US’ “one China” policy under the Three Joint Communiques (for the ROC and the PRC) and the Taiwan Relations Act (for Taiwan and the US). There is only “one China” and Taiwan is not part of it.

John Hsieh

Hayward, California

 

附錄二

America's "China Policy" Is in Urgent Need of Definition

Lecture #974 on Asia, The Heritage Foundation

By John J. Tkacik, Jr.

4/19/2005

The sudden emergence of China's "Anti-Separation Law" (also called the "Anti-Secession Law") this past December was a surprise because, even by Chinese standards, it was unnecessary. Just six days before its announcement, legislative elections in Taiwan reflected waning political sentiment on the island for constitutional reforms affecting Taiwan's de jure status as the Republic of China.

That China went ahead and initiated a "legislative" process to put this law on the books was a clear indication that China has moved away from its "fundamental policy of striving for peaceful reunification" and toward a posture of military threat to Taiwan. It is a development that reveals a dangerous weakness in our current China policy: It rests on slogans that have no substance.

Slogans of China Policy

Let me explain. Three core elements of America's China policy are:

"Our One China Policy";

Our opposition to unilateral change in the Taiwan Strait's "status quo as we define it"; and

Our "non-support" of Taiwan independence.

These three core elements literally have no substance in the sense that none of them is defined anywhere in the official lexicon of American diplomacy. And insofar as anyone has any idea about what they really mean, their meaning has no relationship to the actual words that U.S. policymakers use to describe those elements.

Consequently, when confronted by actions, either by China or Taiwan that tend to annoy or upset the other, no American Administration has possessed a coherent policy framework within which to manage the controversy. Over the years, this lack of coherence has had the unfortunate effect of confusing both the President and the Congress. Our China policy has become an impressionistic fabric similar to Justice Potter Stewart's view of pornography; that is, "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description [of pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it...."1

In short, our China policy is so vaporous that to call it a "policy" would invest it with a level of thought that is entirely absent.

 

A Policy of Non-Definition

Since the end of the Second World War, it has been the official policy of the United States government that the post-World War II status of Taiwan is "an unsettled question subject to future international resolution." Taiwan was a former colony of the Empire of Japan to which Japan abjured in the document of surrender all "right, title and claim" in perpetuity. However, Japan pointedly did not designate any of its victorious enemy nations as the recipient of Taiwan, leaving it for the allied powers to sort out in the fullness of time.2

The Korean War and the Cold War intervened to prevent the allies from designating "China" (either Chiang Kai-shek's government-in-exile on Taiwan or Mao Zedong's new "People's Republic of China" in Beijing) as the new sovereign over Taiwan, and the matter went unsettled when the final peace treaty with Japan was signed in San Francisco in September 1951. The USSR refused to sign the treaty. It objected, among other things, to the provision regarding Formosa and the Pescadores:

[T]his draft grossly violates the indisputable rights of China to the return of integral parts of Chinese territory: Taiwan, the Pescadores, the Paracel and other islands.... The draft contains only a refer-ence to the renunciation by Japan of its rights to these territories but intentionally omits any mention of the further fate of these territories.3

The "unsettled" status of Taiwan remains the policy of the United States government to this day, except that constant repetition of the phrase "one China policy" has given America's political leaders, in both the Congress and the executive branch, the vague impression that somehow the United States formally recognizes that Taiwan is a part of China.

Compounding the confusion is the Administration's resolute refusal to be clear on the matter (and this is not just a problem with the present Administration, but with all previous ones dating back to President Nixon's first term). For example, just one year ago, before the House Committee on International Relations, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly had the following exchange, redolent of a certain Stewartesque syntax, with Representative Grace Napolitano (D-CA):

REP. NAPOLITANO: The next question, then, is can the evolution of full-fledged democracy on Taiwan and the clear emergence of a sense of Taiwanese identity meld with the principle of One China, or are they in stark contrast with each other?

MR. KELLY: There certainly is a degree of contrast. The definition of One China is something that we could go on for much too long for this event. In my testimony, I made the point "our One China," and I didn't really define it, and I'm not sure I very easily could define it.

I can tell you what it is not. It is not the One-China policy or the One-China principle that Beijing suggests, and it may not be the definition that some would have in Taiwan. But it does convey a meaning of solidarity of a kind among the people on both sides of the straits that has been our policy for a very long time.4

Indeed, Secretary Kelly was one of the few diplomats in the State Department who actually understood what our position on "One China" really was, and tried his best to differentiate it from Beijing's "One China Principle" by calling it "Our One China." But the net effect at the end of that day was to leave Representative Napolitano--and everyone else on the committee, I suspect--just as uninformed about U.S. policy as they were at the start of his testimony.

In his testimony of April 21 last year, Secretary Kelly also listed another core element of our China policy: "The U.S. does not support independence for Taiwan or unilateral moves that would change the status quo as we define it." No one on the committee had the presence of mind to ask Secretary Kelly just how the Administration defined the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, but six months later, members of the press engaged his deputy, Randall G. Schriver, in the following Stewartesque exchange:

QUESTION: Randy, how do you define Taiwan independence? Would a change of the name of the country be--or change the national flag--be considered as independence? Thank you.

MR. SCHRIVER: I don't think it's useful for me to get into a variety of hypotheticals, and I think, actually, it's fairly obvious and fairly clear what we mean by our non-support for Taiwan independence. I mean, you could throw out a range of things, and I just don't want to address them one at a time about the implications, and "is this independence or is that independence?" I think the statement, and our intent behind it, is quite clear.5

In fact, it was not "quite clear." Clarity was precisely the quality that Secretary Schriver hoped to avoid when he answered the question.

In general, a democracy cannot have a coherent foreign policy if it refuses to define the core elements of that policy. These two core elements--"One China" and "status quo in the Taiwan Strait"--are central to America's China policy, yet they are undefined and internally contradictory.

I consider our China policy to be fatally flawed in the sense that the key terms used to describe it are precisely the opposite of what the words mean on their face. That is, "one China" does not mean that the United States recognizes that Taiwan is part of China, but only that the United States only recognizes one government of China at a time. And "status quo as we define it" is nowhere defined either in public or within the confidential proceedings of the executive branch.

A third misconceived element of our China policy, which Secretary James Kelly enumerated at his testimony last year, is that "the U.S. does not support independence for Taiwan." There is an obvious incongruity between this "non-support" for Taiwan's independence and America's devotion to the "expansion of democracy" in Taiwan and our sales of hundreds of millions, indeed billions, of dollars in defense articles and services to Taiwan each year since 1979. Why, pray tell, are we selling Taiwan the instruments to defend themselves with if we do not support Taiwan's continued separation from China--and hence Taiwan's independence?

The answer is quite sound. Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman pointed to the congressional mandate of the Taiwan Relations Act to "maintain the capacity to resist the use of force against...Taiwan" and averred that "the United States takes these obligations very seriously." He explained:

[T]he President's National Security Strategy, published in September 2002, calls for "building a balance of power that favors freedom." Taiwan's evolution into a true multi-party democracy over the past decade is proof of the importance of America's commitment to Taiwan's defense. It strengthens American resolve to see Taiwan's democracy grow and prosper.6

That sums it up nicely. Why, then, can't the United States government say this out loud? Why do American diplomats blame the Taiwan Relations Act for our support of Taiwan? Why cannot even Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice tell the Chinese that our arms sales to Taiwan are to enable Taiwan to defend its democracy against the threats of tyranny?7

The reasons for this are historical, but, truth be told, they are simply force of habit. Dr. Henry Kissinger apparently gave a secret assurance to Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1971 that the State Department would no longer refer in public to the status of Taiwan as undetermined.8 Apparently through some misplaced loyalty to Dr. Kissinger's secret assurances to Beijing 34 year ago, State Department officials still refuse to say in public that U.S. policy is that Taiwan's legal status remains "unsettled."

Over the decades, on occasion, the State Department has actually hinted at this unsettled state of affairs on Taiwan's legal status in its correspondence and responses to the Congress. However, rather than adhere to a rigorous and precise vagueness, executive branch spokesmen, and indeed the President himself, betray constant and pervasive befuddlement when it comes to matters of Taiwan and China. The President has on occasion referred to Taiwan as a country in its own right,9 and the Secretary of State has called Taiwan a "part of China."10 A scandalous lack of precision in our policy terminology has led to the confusion of otherwise intelligent policymakers.

 

A Policy of Pretense

Very early in the U.S.-China relationship, both sides realized that they could not sustain a cooperative strategic partnership against the Soviet Union if each insisted that the other side foreswear core tenets of its foreign policy. From 1971 through 1989, U.S.-China relations were built on an unspoken but very real understanding that enabled both sides to ignore the paramount conflict in their essential interests. It was an understanding based on pretense: China pretends to have a "policy of peaceful unification with Taiwan," in return for which the United States pretends to have a "one China policy."

The Congress of the United States was clearly frustrated by the fact that this understanding was unspoken and insisted that it be made explicit. It did so in a profound and direct way in 1979 in the Taiwan Relations Act, which declared it the "policy of the United States...(3) to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means."11

President Ronald Reagan was equally perplexed by the bureaucracy's aversion to spelling out this linkage. In August 1982, coincident with the announcement of the U.S.-China Joint Communique of August 17, 1982, on the question of Taiwan arms sales, President Reagan issued a presidential statement that declared "the Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese people, on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, to resolve. We will not interfere in this matter or prejudice the free choice of, or put pressure on, the people of Taiwan in this matter.12

But President Reagan went one step beyond this public statement to mandate this linkage in a confidential presidential directive designed to guide executive branch dealings with China and Taiwan. Indeed, President Reagan declared this linkage was to be a "permanent imperative of U.S. foreign policy."

As you know, I have agreed to the issuance of a joint communique with the People's Republic of China in which we express United States policy toward the matter of continuing arms sales to Taiwan.

The talks leading up to the signing of the communique were premised on the clear understanding that any reduction of such arms sales depends upon peace in the Taiwan Strait and the continuity of China's declared "fundamental policy" of seeking a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.

In short, the U.S. willingness to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan is conditioned absolutely upon the continued commitment of China to the peaceful solution of the Taiwan-PRC differences. It should be clearly understood that the linkage between these two matters is a permanent imperative of U.S. foreign policy.

In addition, it is essential that the quantity and quality of the arms provided Taiwan be conditioned entirely on the threat posed by the PRC. Both in quantitative and qualitative terms, Taiwan's defense capability relative to that of the PRC will be maintained.13

 

The Challenge of the Anti-Separation Law

China's pretense of a "peaceful policy" toward Taiwan has eroded significantly since 1993.

In August 1993, with the issuance of a "white paper" on Taiwan relations, Beijing reiterated that "any sovereign state is entitled to use any means it deems necessary, including military ones, to uphold its sovereignty and territorial integrity" and asserted flatly that "the Chinese Government is under no obligation to undertake any commitment to any foreign power or people intending to split China as to what means it might use to handle its own domestic affairs."14

From 1992 to the present, China's military spending has increased at double-digit rates, something one might not have expected following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Virtually every other country threatened by Soviet expansion cut its defense spending significantly in an effort to reap a "peace dividend."

In July 1995, China's hostile intentions toward Taiwan were manifest when Beijing closed the heavily trafficked Taiwan Strait to commercial shipping for several days while it conducted unprecedented "missile tests," generally viewed as an expression of anger at efforts by Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui to improve his country's international standing.

In March 1996, the Chinese People's Liberation Army tested nuclear-capable short-range ballistic missiles in the Taiwan Strait, again closing that important sea-lane to international traffic, in an effort to intimidate Taiwan's voters during their first-ever presidential elections.

In August 1999, Chinese high-performance jet fighters, for the first time, began to patrol the Taiwan Strait at the "center line," challenging Taiwan jet fighters and raising tensions.

And in February 2000, China issued another white paper which called for the use of "all drastic measures possible including the use of force" if Taiwan did not declare itself part of China and agree to negotiations by a certain date.15

If the United States had possessed a coherent and consistent China policy, these separate Chinese challenges to the status quo would have been countered by calibrated "restatements" from Washington about our "one China" policy. But they were not.

 

China's Anti-Separation Law and the U.S. Reaction

It is to the Bush Administration's credit that it is finally doing so as it confronts the Anti-Separation Law. The ASL is a convincing indicator that China's commitment to peace in the Taiwan Strait is weak at best.

Early unofficial draft iterations of the ASL--which had initially been referred to as the "National Unification Law"--had been floating around on the Internet at least since 2002 and included all sorts of strange stipulations. Dr. Yu Yuanzhou of Wuhan University proposed legislation that would require the Chinese People's Liberation Army to attack Taiwan as soon as it is able (no need to await any Taiwanese independence), beginning with bombard-ments of Quemoy and Matsu, which, according to Article 27 of his draft, "would not be limited to conventional weapons."16

Understandably, the Bush Administration was dismayed when the ASL was announced on December 17, 2004. The Administration's perplexity was heightened because it followed hard on elections in Taiwan that indicated sentiment for new constitutional revisions had cooled, and hence, Beijing had no justification for stirring the pot with this new legislation.

At first, the Administration's major worry was that China would try to "define" the status quo in the Strait beyond its existing vague guideline. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher told the press on February 15 that the "U.S. Government has been quite clear that we don't think either side should take unilateral steps that try to define the situation further or push it in one direction or another."17 For consistency's sake, the Department of State doesn't want to confine just itself to avoiding definitions, but seems to extend its aversion to defining the status quo to all the players. Again, to the Administration's credit, U.S. officials have maintained a consistent and tough line with all their Chinese interlocutors on the ASL.18

When the Chinese went ahead and passed the law on March 14, the week prior to Secretary of State Rice's visit to Beijing, the Secretary was even tougher. "We've made very clear that the anti-secession law was not a welcome development because anything that is unilateral in this and that increases tensions, which clearly the anti-secession law did increase tensions, is not good."19 I have been told that Secretary Rice was even more blunt in her private meetings with Chinese leaders.

The reason for her unhappiness is clear. The central mandate of Beijing's new "Anti-National Separation Law" (Fan Fenlie Guojia Fa or, literally, "Law against Splitting the Nation") is the declaration that China "shall" use military force against Taiwan whenever the Chinese leadership decides that all possibilities for "peaceful reunification" with Taiwan have been exhausted.20 But the Anti-Separation Law makes no pretense of defining either what would constitute an act "entailing" secession or what it might mean to exhaust "all possibilities" for peaceful reunification.

As such, the ASL serves as a free-standing, permanent casus belli against Taiwan and the United States. In short, the ASL is an open-ended declaration of war against Taiwan in which the Beijing authorities reserve the right to launch "non-peaceful" actions against the people of Taiwan whenever they wish and without forewarning.

This pre-legitimization of war is a very real change in China's stance toward Taiwan--and indeed toward the United States, which sees the preservation of Taiwan's democracy and autonomy from Beijing as in both its political and strategic interests.

In presenting the draft ASL to the National People's Congress on March 8, 2005, NPC Vice Chairman Wang Zhaoguo asserted that China's constitution stipulates that "Taiwan is an unalienable part of the sacred territory of the People's Republic of China."21 In this context, it is ironic to note that the only piece of the world's geography that the Chinese constitution declares is an unalienable part of the PRC is Taiwan. Not Beijing or Shanghai or Xinjiang or Tibet.

It is also ironic that the Chinese government insists that the English-language rendering of fan fenlie guojia fa is "Anti Secession Law." Of course, Taiwan has never been administered by the People's Republic of China, and it seems an oxymoron to suggest that Taiwan could secede from a country to which it has never belonged in the first place.

 

How the U.S. Should React to the ASL

Let me suggest a few ways in which the Congress might remedy the flaws in U.S. policy.

Define Our Policy. Recognizing that a problem exists is the first step to finding a solution. In its oversight role, Congress should insist that the Administration actually define its Taiwan policy.

This does not necessarily mean that the Congress should force the Administration into a public enunciation of a policy toward Taiwan that directly antagonizes Beijing. But at the very least, the Administration should be required to develop internal "terms of reference" for Taiwan. What exactly is the "status quo" in the Taiwan Strait? What is "our" one China policy? If we don't support Taiwan's continued separation from China--a separation that has already lasted for 107 of the last 110 years--then why has the Congress mandated in the Taiwan Relations Act that national policy is "to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan"?

Maintain the Linkage. President Reagan's "permanent imperative" of a linkage between China's peaceful policy toward Taiwan and our support for Taiwan's defense, and hence its continued separation from China, is clearly in America's interests. Therefore, any step Beijing takes that casts a cloud over its so-called peaceful policy must be matched by a concomitant U.S. step in support of Taiwan's democracy.

If the Administration finds it diplomatically inopportune to react to some act of Chinese bellicosity in the Taiwan Strait, there may well be instances where a congressional reaction would give the Administration leverage with Beijing. Beijing's Anti Separation Law, which Chinese diplomats insist is merely a restatement of existing Chinese law and policy, could be balanced by new U.S. legislation--perhaps along the lines of the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (H.R. 1838), which passed the House of Representatives with a veto-proof margin of 341-70 on February 1, 2000. The TSEA, after all, was also a restatement of existing U.S. policies toward Taiwan.

I myself am personally fond of President Reagan's 1982 commitments to Taiwan's president known as the "Six Assurances."22 Because they are already a part of existing U.S. policy, enshrining the "Six Assurances" in a future House resolution would also be a very effective counter to future Chinese actions that might challenge the stability and peace of the Taiwan Strait.

Demand a Strategy. The Cheshire Cat's first dictum is that if you don't know where you're going, any road will get you there. If the United States has no idea what it wants China or Taiwan to look like in five years (let alone 10 or 20), then it doesn't matter what policies it adopts. As Dr. Condoleezza Rice wrote in Foreign Affairs five years ago, "China is not a `status quo' power but one that would like to alter Asia's balance of power in its own favor."23 This assessment makes it absolutely essential that the United States understand what its own strategic interests, goals, and objectives are in Asia.

Conclusion

Sadly, there is no such vision guiding U.S. policy toward China or Taiwan. The Congress should therefore require one. In particular, the Administration must be attentive to America's interests in Taiwan. Not only is Taiwan a thriving democracy, and not only is it America's tenth largest export market, but Taiwan has also been an important security partner for the United States.

The executive branch must be required to conduct a strategic survey--confidential if necessary--of U.S. interests in the region and to consider the possible ramifications to America's strategic posture in the Western Pacific should Taiwan be forced into a relationship with China that would preclude continued U.S. strategic cooperation with Taiwan. Thereafter, policy decisions regarding China and Taiwan must be made to conform with U.S. goals.

John J. Tkacik, Jr., is Senior Research Fellow in Asian Studies in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. These remarks are adapted from testimony prepared for delivery at a hearing of the House Committee on International Relations.

________________________________________

1. See Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 US 184 (1964).

2. See Memorandum from the Department of State Legal Advisor (L/EA - Robert I. Starr) to the Director of the Office of Republic of China Affairs (Charles T. Sylvester], July 13, 1971, "Subject: Legal Status of Taiwan." This memorandum is reprinted as Appendix C in John J. Tkacik, ed., Rethinking One China (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2004), p. 181.

3. Ibid.

4. Hearing, The Taiwan Relations Act: The Next Twenty-Five Years, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, April 21, 2004, p. 40, at http://commdocs.house.gov/…/in…/hfa93229.000/hfa93229_0f.htm.

5. Randy Schriver, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Briefing for the Foreign Press Center, U.S. State Department, Washington, D.C., November 20, 2003, at http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/26534.htm.

6. Hearing, The Taiwan Relations Act: The Next Twenty-Five Years, p. 23. Rodman referred to U.S. National Security Council, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.

7. Department of State officials have been particularly reluctant to acknowledge America's commitment to Taiwan as a kindred democracy and instead insist that the U.S. commitment is simply a legal "obligation." For example, in her meetings with Chinese leaders in Beijing on March 21, 2005, Secretary Rice would say only, "I reiterated that the United States does, in fact, have a `One China' policy...that also recognizes American obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act." See Secretary Condoleezza Rice, "Remarks to the Press in China," China World Hotel, Beijing, March 21, 2005, at www.state.gov/

secretary/rm/2005/43678.htm.

8. See Kissinger's record of his conversation with Premier Zhou of October 21, 1971, classified TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY, White House, "Memorandum of Conversation," October 21, 1971, p. 27.

9. During remarks on trade policy, President Bush said, "And that's good, that's important to recognize and to welcome both countries, both the Republic of Taiwan, and of course China, into the World Trade Organization." See "President Calls on Senate to Pass Trade Promotion Authority," Remarks by the President on Trade Promotion Authority, Benjamin Franklin Room, the Department of State, April 4, 2002, at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020404-4.html.

10. Secretary Colin L. Powell, Interview with Mike Chinoy of CNN International TV, China World Hotel, Beijing, China, October 25, 2004, at www.state.gov/secretary/rm/37366.htm.

11. Taiwan Relations Act, P.L. 96-8, April 10, 1979.

12. See Presidential Statement on Issuance of Communique, August 17, 1982, in hearing, China-Taiwan: United States Policy, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., August 18, 1982, p. 33. Emphasis added.

13. Emphasis added. For the full text of this short memo, see James R. Lilley and Jeff Lilley, China Hands: Nine Decades of Adventure, Espionage, and Diplomacy in Asia (New York: Public Affairs Books, 2004), p. 248. See also Jim Mann, About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), p. 127.

14. Beijing's August 30, 1993, white paper on The Taiwan Question and the Reunification of China reiterated that the PRC "is the sole legal government of China and Taiwan is a part of China"; declared that the United States was responsible for the "Taiwan Question"; and stated flatly that Taiwan membership in the United Nations was "out of the question."

15. China State Council, Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information Office, "The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue," February 21, 2000, at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/…/taiwanpaper/taiwana.html. The white paper declared, among other things, that the "government of the `Republic of China'...has long since completely forfeited its right to exercise state sovereignty on behalf of China and, in reality, has always remained only a local authority in Chinese territory," and "if the Taiwan authorities refuse, sine die, the peaceful settlement of cross-Straits reunification through negotiations, then the Chinese government will only be forced to adopt all drastic measures possible, including the use of force, to...fulfill the great cause of reunification."

16. See Yu Yuanzhou, "Law for the Promotion of the National Unification of the People's Republic of China (Scholar's Suggested Draft)," November 1, 2002, at www.peacehall.com/news/gb/pubvp/2004/05/200405190839.shtml(in Chinese).

17. Department of State Daily Briefing, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, Washington, D.C., February 15, 2005, at www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2005/42316.htm. Emphasis added.

18. See John J. Tkacik, "Secession Law Strains Ties," Asian Wall Street Journal, March 9, 2005, p. 10, at http://online.wsj.com/

article/0,,SB111031906988273848,00.html.

19. Rice, "Remarks to the Press in China."

20. The text of the Anti-Separation Law neither defines how China's leadership would determine when "all possibilities" have been exhausted nor defines a "major incident" that would "entail" Taiwan's separation from China. See Article 8: "In the event that the `Taiwan independence' secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity." The English text of the ASL is available at the Web site of the official Xinhua news agency at http://news.xinhuanet.com/eng…/2005-03/…/content_2694180.htm, "Full text of Anti-Secession Law"; the Chinese text is at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscent…/…/14/content_2694168.htm.

21. "Explication Regarding the `Law Against the Separation of the Nation (Draft)'," Xinhua News Agency, March 8, 2005, at

http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscent…/…/08/content_2666011.htm (in Chinese).

22. John H. Holdridge, "China-Taiwan: United States Policy," testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, August 18, 1982, pp. 15-16. Holdridge described the "Six Assurances" in his memoir. See John H. Holdridge, Crossing the Divide: An Insider's Account of Normalization of U.S.-China Relations (Lanham, Md.: Rowan and Littlefield, 1997), p. 232.

23. Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, January-February 2000, p. 56.

 

附錄三

A Primer on U.S. Policy Toward the "One-China" Issue: Questions and Answers

By Harvey Feldman

Backgrounder #1429 on Asia

The Heritage Foundation

April 12, 2001

The Bush Administration has just faced its first foreign policy crisis. China announced on April 11 that the crew of a U.S. Navy surveillance aircraft, held since April 1, would be released. The U.S. plane and a Chinese jet fighter collided in mid-air over international waters. The damaged American airplane made an emergency landing on China's Hainan Island, where it and its 24 crew members were detained.

This incident came on the heels of another diplomatic crisis involving China: A U.S.-based Chinese scholar is being held on charges of spying. Her husband and young son, both American citizens, also were held for a time--the five-year-old boy separate from either parent. China apparently breached a bilateral consular agreement in failing to inform the U.S. embassy in Beijing about their detention. The same is true of an American-citizen scholar who teaches in Hong Kong.

China appears to be testing the new U.S. President. After enjoying eight years of foreign policy weakness under the Clinton Administration, China's leaders are likely concerned that the White House will at last stand up to their provocations. And no issue concerns them more than the possibility that the United States will sell defensive arms to Taiwan. President George W. Bush is scheduled to decide this month whether to agree to a request from Taiwan to purchase ships equipped with air defense systems that can repel missiles.

China considers that Taiwan is part of its sovereign territory which the U.S. conspires with Taiwan independence supporters to keep separate. The United States, on the other hand, believes that the ultimate decision on the status of Taiwan must be worked out peaceably by the governments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. To this end, and in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8), it sells defensive weapons so that the island republic can "maintain a sufficient self-defense capability."

 

U.S. policy toward Taiwan and China is built upon carefully chosen nuances and discreet silences. Given that this set of statements--and omissions--so obviously departs from what is seen in the real world, it is not surprising that even White House spokesmen and senior officials over the past two decades have misspoken and added to the confusion.

The questions and answers that follow are an attempt to demystify the unique diplomatic rhetoric surrounding U.S. policy toward Taiwan.

 

Q: When the United States recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1979, didn't it also recognize or accept the proposition that Taiwan is a part of China?[當美國在1979年承認中華人民共和國時，它有承認或接受台灣是中國的一部分的主張嗎?]

 

A: No.[答案是: 沒有。] In extending diplomatic recognition to the PRC, in a Joint Communique dated January 1, 1979, the United States said it "acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China." The word "acknowledges" is polite, diplomatic speech for we understand that this is the position you take. In fact, neither then nor since has the United States formally stated that Taiwan is a part of the People's Republic of China or officially agreed to this claim of the PRC. [事實上，美國在承認中華人民共和國那時以及從那時開始，都沒有官式地或正式地說「台灣是中華人民共和國的一部分」，也沒有官式地同意中華人民共和國該項主張。]

 

Q: What then is the U.S. view of Taiwan's status? [那麼美國對台灣的地位到底持什麼觀點?]

 

A: In formal statements, such as communiques, the U.S. has remained completely agnostic, taking no position at all on Taiwan's status. [在一些正式的聲明中，如美中三公報，美國一直都是持完全的不可知論，對台灣的地位沒有採取任何立場，這就是台灣法律地位未定論。]But this unique situation has been complicated by less than formal or truly official statements by past administrations. For example, answering a question at a public meeting in Shanghai in June 1998, President Bill Clinton said that "we don't support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan, one China. And we don't believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement." This echoed the Chinese position, sometimes called the "three nos."

But to say that "we," meaning the Clinton Administration, will not support independence for Taiwan, or a solution that results in a Taiwan separate from the PRC, is not the same thing as saying, formally or informally, that Taiwan lacks the qualities necessary for independence or existence separate from China.

In fact, American law, in the form of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 96-8, directly contradicts Mr. Clinton's statement that Taiwan should not be a member of any organization that requires statehood for membership:

Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan.1

Whenever authorized by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to conduct or carry out programs, transactions, or other relations with respect to foreign countries, nations, states, governments and similar entities, the President or any agency of the United States Government is authorized to conduct and carry out...such transactions and other relations with respect to Taiwan....2

Specifically on the subject of membership in international organizations of all types, the Act says, "Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in any financial institution or any other international organization" 3 The Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations Act makes plain that Congress intended the United States to support Taiwan's membership in international organizations.

 

Q: So is Taiwan a state or not? What is its status in international law?

 

A: Taiwan meets all the qualifications laid down in international law for statehood: defined territory, defined population, and the capability of entering into international agreements with other states. Taiwan is recognized diplomatically by 29 other countries, all of which are members of the United Nations. It is important to bear in mind that the absence of U.S. diplomatic recognition does not alter status in international law.

One can look at it this way: At one minute before midnight on December 31, 1978, the United States recognized the Republic of China on Taiwan as a state, and as the sole legal government of China. At one minute after midnight on January 1, 1979, the United States no longer recognized Taiwan diplomatically. But nothing happened on Taiwan itself to change its status from one thing to another.

 

Q: Does the government on Taiwan still claim to be the sole legal government of China?

 

A: No, it does not. It claims to be the legitimate government of Taiwan and associated islands, chosen and elected by its people, and goes on to say that within the broad historic and cultural entity of China, there are now two separately governed jurisdictions, with each qualified for international recognition and membership in international organizations.

Taiwan is a multiparty, free-market democracy that ranks 13th in the world in trade. Its population of 22.4 million is larger than two-thirds of the members of the United Nations. On a per capita basis, Taiwan buys more American products than any country except Canada.

 

Q: Didn't the U.S. sign a communique with the PRC in August 1982 saying it would end arms sales to Taiwan? How come the U.S. is still selling them?

 

A: The communique of August 17, 1982, said that the U.S. "intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over time to a final resolution." In signing this communique, President Ronald Reagan said this policy was based on China's statements that peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question was its "fundamental policy," and that America's "future actions will be conducted with this peaceful policy fully in mind."

Meanwhile, the Taiwan Relations Act specifies: "The United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability."4 The law goes on to state that "The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan...."5

As the PRC increased its verbal threats to use military force against Taiwan, emplaced ground attack missiles opposite the island republic, and began a program of acquiring advanced arms from Russia, successive U.S. administrations have concluded it was necessary to continue to provide the military articles and services necessary to Taiwan's defense--just as American law provides.

 

Q: Does this mean the United States has some kind of military alliance with Taiwan?

 

A: No, it does not. But the Taiwan Relations Act does state that our diplomatic relationship with the PRC "rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means."6

It goes on to say the U.S. would "consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States."7 That section of the law concludes by saying that the United States will "maintain the capacity ... to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan."8

 

Q: Does the United States have any other commitments to Taiwan?

 

A: Yes. At the same time as he agreed to the August 17, 1982, communique, President Reagan gave six specific assurances to the government of Taiwan. These were:

The United States has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan.

The United States has not agreed to hold consultations with the PRC prior to agreeing on arms sales to Taiwan.

The United States will not act as a mediator between Taiwan and the PRC.

The United States has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act.

The United States has not altered its position on the question of sovereignty over Taiwan.

The United States will not pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC.

 

CONCLUSION

The issue of Taiwan is certain to play a major role in U.S.-China relations for some time to come. If all of those who try to explain American policy on this thorny subject can stick to the basic texts--the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques9, and the Six Assurances given Taiwan by President Reagan--U.S. policy will appear less confusing and less contradictory.

Ambassador Harvey Feldman is Senior Fellow for China Policy in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.

 

1. Taiwan Relations Act, Section 4(b)(1).

2. Taiwan Relations Act, Section 4(b)(2).

3. Taiwan Relations Act, Section 4(c), emphasis added.

4. Taiwan Relations Act, Section 3(a).

5. Taiwan Relations Act, Section 3(b).

6. Taiwan Relations Act, Section 2(b)(3).

7. Taiwan Relations Act, Section 2(b)(4).

8. Taiwan Relations Act, Section 2(b)(6).

9. The three Joint Communiques are dated February 28, 1972; January 1, 1979; and August 17, 1982.